Why do we need law reform for cohabitants?
1 For most commentators the answer is all too obvious: unmarried women are 1 Despite the fact that the English and Welsh Law Commission covers same-sex relationships within its remit (not to do so would open the government to an all too obvious challenge under the Human Rights Act 1998), my paper specifically addresses the issue of cohabiting women in heterosexual relationships. The 'push for reform' for cohabitants has come from a concern to protect such women and it is this issue that I am interested in for the purposes of this paper. That any proposals for reform will also be extended to same-sex partners under principles of equality, constructs an interesting trajectory in which reform will, on the argument of this paper, be addressed to women in terms of economic disadvantage arising from (or exacerbated by) heterosexual partnerships, but will then be automatically extended to cover very different scenarios. (See further Bottomley & Wong (2006) ).
too often disadvantaged when dealing with property (by which is usually meant the home in which they have been living) at the end of a cohabiting relationship. The general argument swings on two related points: the first that property law favours the economically dominant partner and the second that, as women are still economically disadvantaged, they are more likely than their partners to suffer economic vulnerability at the end of a relationship. The solution, again, seems all too obvious: extend the protection and benefits of family (marriage) law to the unmarried. In particular, family (divorce) law allows the court to redistribute property between the parties, taking into account factors which are not (overtly at least) recognised in property law, notably the age of the parties and length of the relationship, the circumstances which brought the relationship to an end, contributions made to the welfare of the family (caring) and future needs. 2 In the light of the recent trend in reported decisions to award, in appropriate cases, what seems to be a rather more generous amount to an ex-wife, 3 it seems to many increasingly unjust not to allow unmarried cohabitants access to the same process of decision-making, especially given the number of couples who are now cohabiting rather than marrying.
This article is intended as something of a counterweight to this push for reform. Written primarily as a call for a more careful evaluation of the arguments 'for realism', it also raises questions about why the government, having made clear their initial preference to support marriage (on the basis that the statistics suggest that marriage is a more stable social unit than cohabitation), now seem to be moving towards a position that could support the extension of certain benefits of marriage (or rather divorce) to the unmarried, especially the benefit of property adjustment orders. It is part of my argument that we should consider why the government is now willing, it seems, to reconsider its initial position in favour of marriage. For some sections of the establishment any pattern of reform of this nature will be controversial in (it is argued) further undermining the legal
